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MENTAL TIME TRAVEL AND THE VALUATION OF FINANCIAL INVESTMENTS 
David Blake and John Pickles 





To portray the valuation of financial investments as mental time travel.   
Design/methodology/approach 
In a series of thought investments, $1 invested in an investment fund is mentally projected forward in 
time and then discounted back to the present – with no objective time passing. The thought 
investments feature symmetric valuation (in which discount rates exactly match projection rates) and 
asymmetric valuation (in which discount rates and projection rates happen to differ). They show how 
asymmetric valuation can result in differences between the current personal value and market value 
of an investment and, by way of real-world illustration, between a closed-end investment fund’s net 
asset value and its market value. We explore possible reasons for asymmetric valuation. 
Findings 
Thought investments illustrating mental time travel can be used to help understand both financial 
investment valuation generally and, more specifically, established explanations of the closed-end 
investment fund puzzle. We show how different expectations, different perceptions of time and risk 
and different risk and time preferences might help determine value. 
Originality 
There are vast literatures on prospection, discounting and future-orientated or intertemporal 
decision-making. Our innovation is to illustrate how these mental activities might combine to facilitate 
financial investment valuation. In particular, we show that a low personal discount rate could be a 
consequence of a shortened perception of future time and vice versa.  
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This paper was motivated by a discussion at a conference that one of the authors attended some years 
ago about whether $1 invested in equities is worth more than, less than or the same as $1 invested in 
bonds. Valuing financial investments, such as equities and bonds, involves mental time travel – 
forwards and backwards.  In the paper, we explore some of the different paths such travel might take.  
In a series of “thought investments”: an invested $1 is projected forward; and the projected value is 
discounted back to the present. To keep things simple, we assume a positive expected return – in the 
form of capital appreciation rather than income – on all thought investments. We use the term 
“thought investment” in the same sense as “thought experiment”. This is mentally simulated value 
transformation; and it is important to note that no objective time passes during the investment. 
Because future time and risk are subjective (i.e., they are “perceived” and they reflect preferences), 
so too are projected and discounted values. 
Projections are integral to financial investment valuation. Indeed, all financial decisions can be viewed 
as being based on forecasts of future value (Utkus, 2011). Chart 1 is what we call a “value-time chart”.  
It is derived from Mitchell and Utkus, 2004 and illustrates two projection methods. An invested $1 is 
projected forward 30 years: “exponentially” at 6% p.a. to $5.74 [1] and “hyperbolically” to $3.32 [2].  
 
CHART 1: EXPONENTIAL AND HYPERBOLIC PROJECTION AND DISCOUNTING – SYMMETRIC VALUATION 
 
Exponential projection is a common assumption in time value of money calculations with rates being 
postulated not to vary today, tomorrow or, indeed, many years from now. Exponential investors 
foresee future values increasing at a constant rate, thanks to the benefits of compounding. Not all 





















grow more rapidly in the short term than in the long term. So, they perceive decreasing benefits to 
long-term investment – rewards are expected to accelerate quickly and then taper off (Mitchell and 
Utkus, 2004). The hyperbolic curve in Chart 1 reflects this: it rises more rapidly in the near future (the 
first five years) than in the far future (the last five years).  
Chart 1 can also be read as illustrating two discounting methods. A future payment of $5.74 is 
discounted exponentially at 6% p.a. [3], while a payment of $3.32 is discounted hyperbolically [4], 
both to a current value of $1. Practitioners typically assume that discount functions are exponential 
(Angeletos et al., 2001), whereas a growing body of experimental evidence suggests that hyperbolic 
discounting – in which value declines at a more rapid rate in the short term than the long term – better 
describes how many individuals value delayed rewards (Thaler, 1981, Frederick et al., 2002, Laibson, 
2003, Ainslie, 2005, and Berns et al., 2007). The hyperbolic curve in Chart 1 reflects this: it falls more 
rapidly in the near future (the first five years) than in the far future (the last five years). (Exponential 
and hyperbolic discounting are the two methods that feature most prominently in the time 
discounting research literature, but there are, of course, others: Doyle, 2013, for example, identifies 
over twenty methods.) 
Chart 1 can thus be read as containing: a pair of exactly matching exponential projection and discount 
curves extending from year-0 to year-30; and a pair of exactly matching hyperbolic curves covering 
the same period. So read, each pair of curves traces a mental time travel journey, or thought 
investment, in which an initial value is instantaneously mentally simulated forward 30 years and then 
back to a current value.  
These curves record investor expectations of future value.  These expectations, in turn, reflect investor 
perceptions and preferences. Where such curves record market expectations, they reflect market 
perceptions and preferences. Where they record personal expectations, such curves reflect personal 
perceptions and preferences. Market expectations are aggregations of the personal expectations of 
all market participants, weighted by the size of their transactions. It follows that individual personal 
expectations, perceptions and preferences may or not match those of the market ‒ and will generally 
only do so if the individual is a “typical” or “average” Investor. 
The thought investments that follow envisage a $1, invested in an investment fund – a publicly traded 
closed-end mutual fund whose assets are publicly traded securities – at current market value, being 
projected forward and then discounted back to a personal value. Sometimes, personal value matches 
market value; sometimes, it does not. They further imagine $1, invested in an investment fund at net 
asset value (NAV), being projected forward and then discounted back to current market value.  
Sometimes, market value matches NAV; sometimes, it does not. (As we discuss later, differences 
between market value and NAV are a well-known puzzle in financial markets.) As with Chart 1, the 
specific numbers and the investment horizons are arbitrary being chosen for illustrative purposes.  
 
In the next section, we look at personal symmetric and asymmetric valuation, together with 
explanations for the latter. In section 3, we do the same for market valuation. In section 4, we examine 






2. PERSONAL VALUATION 
 
2.1 Symmetric personal valuation 
Imagine a $1, invested in an investment fund at current market value, being projected forward 30 
years and then discounted back to a personal value. We can see from Chart 1 that, when discount 
rates exactly track projection rates, $1, so invested, has a current personal value of $1. We might label 
this exact matching of discount and projection rates “symmetric valuation”. So valued, $1 invested in 
an equity fund has the same personal value as $1 invested in a bond fund – both will be valued at $1. 
This is so whether personal valuation is exponential, hyperbolic or any other method [5].  
Symmetric personal valuation does not require personal expectations to match market expectations. 
Think of the two projection curves in Chart 1 as recording the exponential market expectations and 
the hyperbolic personal expectations of the future value of $1 investment in an investment fund. 
Assume that personal expectations are based on the belief that this investment will outperform 
market expectations in the short term but fail to match the returns expected by the market over the 
30-year period. Even if these personal expectations are irrational, $1 will still be personally valued at 
$1 if valuation is symmetric.  
2.2 Asymmetric personal valuation  
Personal valuation is not always symmetric. Sometimes, as we now elaborate, it is asymmetric – 
discount rates do not exactly match projection rates. This can arise both when the methods of 
projecting and discounting are the same and when they differ. Asymmetric valuation does not 
preclude the possibility of an invested $1 having a personal value of $1, but it does reduce its 
likelihood. In Chart 1, for example, we can identify an exponential projection‒hyperbolic discounting 
combination and a hyperbolic projection‒exponential discounting combination which both project a 
year-19 value of $2.96 and which both result in a discounted value of $1. We might term this 
“asymmetric matching”. In the remainder of this section, we consider possible causes and 
consequences of asymmetric valuation. 
 2.2.1 Psychological asymmetry 
Projecting and discounting are mental time travel exercises. Mental time travel allows us to mentally 
visit the future (“prospection”) or the past (“retrospection”) (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). Mental 
time travel theory has traditionally assumed symmetry between prospection and retrospection, 
viewing them as identical save for the direction of travel (Van Boven et al., 2008). Recent research, 
however, reveals that, for many of us, the ways in which we mentally represent the future and the 
past are not the same (Kane et al., 2012).  Prospection differs, in context and experience, from 
retrospection (Van Boven et al., 2008). Future events, for example, are psychologically closer than 
past events of equivalent objective distance ‒ a “temporal Doppler effect” (Caruso et al., 2013). 
Discounting, as in Chart 1, is not retrospection (visiting the past). Rather, it is returning to the present 
from the future (“retrospective prospection”, if you like). Like prospection and retrospection, 
projecting and discounting are sometimes viewed as being identical (Mitchell and Utkus, 2004, for 
example, entitle their diagram, reproduced here as Chart 1, “Exponential versus Hyperbolic 
Discounters: Growth of $1 Over Time”), but some researchers suspect that the two are psychologically 
distinct. Doyle, 2013, for example, suggests that, while their underlying formulae might be closely 
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related mathematically ‒ one being the inverse of the other ‒ their mental operations might differ.  
Loewenstein, 1988, and Weber et al., 2007, for example, find that subjects value delayed and 
accelerated rewards at different rates. And, indeed, projection and discounting are likely to be treated 
differently from each other if they are motivated by different influences. We now look at the influence 
of expectations, perceptions and preferences on valuation. 
 
2.2.2 Expectations 
We noted, in the Introduction, that the temporal value curves in Chart 1 record investor expectations 
which, in turn, reflect investor perceptions and preferences. Expectations can be rational or irrational. 
Irrational investors are sometimes referred to as “noise traders”. Noise traders are prone to “investor 
sentiment” – expectations not justified by the facts (Lee et al., 1991, Baker and Wurgler, 2007). 
Sometimes, noise traders project returns higher than those expected by sophisticated investors; 
sometimes, the opposite.  
We also noted earlier that symmetric valuation does not require rational expectations. On the other 
hand, personal valuation will be asymmetric if personal and market projection rates differ, but 
personal discount rates match those of the market. Such might be the case if market discount rates, 
somehow, influence or dictate personal discount rates. This would require market discount rates to 
be common knowledge. If, as illustrated in Chart 2, the personal year-30 hyperbolic projected value 
of $3.32 was discounted at the market exponential rate of 6%, its current personal value would be 
$0.58 [6]. 

























If we compare the 30-year hyperbolic projection-exponential discounting combination in Chart 2 with 
Chart 1, we can see the influence of time on value. The curves in Chart 1 cross over at year-19. The 
hyperbolic curve in Chart 1 is steeper than the exponential curve for investments with durations below 
19 years, but less steep for longer durations. The implication is that a $1 investment with a duration 
less than 19 years will have a personal value greater than $1 in the case of hyperbolic projection and 
exponential discounting; and an identical investment with a duration greater than 19 years will have 
a personal value less than $1 (as Chart 2 also confirms). They are equal for durations of 19 years. We 
can also see from Chart 1 that the opposite holds when exponential projection and hyperbolic 
discounting combine. 
Personal valuation will also be asymmetric if personal expectations match those of the market, but 
personal and market discount rates differ. In the rest of this section, we assume that personal 
expectations do match market expectations and we consider how different perceptions and 
preferences might cause personal and market discount rates to differ. 
2.2.3 Perceptions – of risk and time 
We noted, earlier, that the temporal value curves in Chart 1 reflect investor perceptions and that, if 
personal perceptions differ from market perceptions, personal valuations might differ from market 
valuations. Two important perceptions relate to risk and time. 
Think of the two curves in Chart 1 as recording the market’s expectations of the future values of two 
investment funds (call them “Exponential” and “Hyperbolic”). Such expectations reflect the market’s 
perceptions of these two funds. Assume that the market perceives that Hyperbolic is riskier than 
Exponential in the short term but less risky in the long term.  Assume, too, that personal expectations 
of the future values of the two funds match those of the market. Individuals who perceive the two 
funds as being equally risky might be inclined to discount their projected values at the same rates and 
hence value one fund symmetrically and the other asymmetrically. Chart 2 can thus, alternatively, be 
read as illustrating the exponential discounting of Hyperbolic’s projected 30-year value. So valued, 
Hyperbolic has a current personal value of $0.58. 
Just as personal risk perceptions can differ from those of the market, so, too, can personal perceptions 
of prospective time duration (Zauberman et al., 2009). Specifically, some individuals’ understanding 
of time differs from objective (or calendar) time. They might perceive, for example, that two years is 
less than twice as far ahead as one year (Bradford et al., 2014). Chart 3 (which is derived from Figure 
3 in Zauberman et al., 2009) illustrates one way in which subjective time might differ from objective 
time. 
In Chart 3, we assume (purely for ease of illustration) that biased time perception is such that two 
years of future calendar time is equivalent to just one year of perceived time. An individual who 
perceives future time in this way will underestimate a calendar period of 30 years’ duration by 15 
years and might consequently value a 30-year investment as illustrated in Chart 4. 
Consider two individuals. The first, without time bias, values a $1 investment symmetrically and 
projects and discounts exponentially as in Chart 1. So, $1 investment over 30 years has a personal 
(present) value of $1. The second individual has a time bias when discounting but not when projecting, 
say, because they are aware that the year-30 investment value is predetermined. In Chart 4, the $1 
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investment is therefore projected forward exponentially, as in Chart 1. Assume for this second 
individual that, as in Chart 3, every two calendar-years’ time is perceived subjectively as one year. This 
means that when discounting, the individual mentally jumps from A to B in Chart 4 and begins to  
discount 15 (rather than 30) years from the current date. So, the projected terminal investment value 
of $5.74 is discounted at the same exponential 6% rate as the projection rate but only for 15 perceived 
years. A $1 investment so valued has a personal value of $2.40 and therefore is attractive.   
CHART 3: OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE TIME  
 
It is equally clear that had this second individual’s time perception been biased in the opposite 
direction, so that one year of future calendar time was equivalent to more than one year of perceived 
time, then the personal value of the $1 investment would be worth less than $1 even though 
projection and discount rates are the same. 
This illustrates how time perception can influence personal discount rates. A $2.40 personal value for 
the $1 investment in Chart 4 can result from either discounting the terminal value of $5.74 at the 
market discount rate of 6% over 15 years of perceived time or discounting it at a personal discount 
rate of 2.95% over 30 years of objective time.  This implies that future time is much nearer mentally – 
or equivalently that perceived time passes more quickly than objective time ‒ for individuals with low 
personal discount rates than for those with high personal discount rates relative to projection rates.  
It is also possible – and indeed likely ‒ that an individual’s perception of time differs over their lifecycle.  
For young children, perceived time tends to pass more slowly than objective time: their next birthday 
party feels as though it is at least 10 years away!  This is equivalent to young children discounting the 
future heavily. For old people, time speeds up ‒ a whole year appears to pass in a few months.  This 

























CHART 4: EFFECT OF TIME BIAS ON VALUATION 
 
All this is, of course, very bad for optimal lifecycle consumption and savings: young people as a 
whole prefer to consume rather than save, while old people find it difficult to dissave and consume 
their accumulated assets, since perceived time appears to pass so quickly.  This behaviour can be 
readily explained in terms of Chart 3 and 4. 
2.2.4 Preferences – for time and risk 
We noted, earlier, that the temporal value curves in Chart 1 reflect investor preferences and that, if 
personal preferences differ from market preferences, personal valuations might differ from market 
valuations. Two important preferences relate to time and risk. 
Frederick et al., 2002, and Hayden, 2016, distinguish time preference (discounting driven solely by a 
preference for the timing of a reward) from discounting generally (devaluation of that reward for any 
reason, including uncertainty). (For a comprehensive discussion, see Loewenstein, 1992, and Frederick 
et al., 2002.) Valuing a future reward less only because it is further away in time signifies positive time 
preference; a higher valuation indicates negative time preference; and equal valuation signals 
temporal neutrality.  
Positive time preference is a synonym for impatience, implying a preference for today over the future 
(Van Liederkerke, 2004). Impatience can be due to a lack of foresight, to a weakness of will or self-
control, to habit or to fashion (Van Liederkerke, 2004). Some of us experience psychological 
discomfort when asked to defer immediate gratification, even for a short period (Loewenstein, 1992, 






















and can resist, or abstain from, immediate gratification. Patience is consistent with far-sightedness 
and with an extended or infinite time horizon.  Patience is a requisite for low or negative discount 
rates.  
Negative time preference has been linked to a desire for improving sequences of outcomes which, in 
turn, can be attributed partly to anticipation (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991). Pleasure from 
anticipation is enhanced if the best comes last. Pleasure from anticipating the future and its rewards 
includes a “bequest motive” (Loewenstein, 1992) – a spirit of altruism which can mean enjoying giving 
for its own sake (Cowen and Parfit, 1992) or which can be personally motivated, as by the desire to 
build a family dynasty, or socially motivated, as by a concern for inter-generational welfare and for 
the protection of the environment.  
Time preference has been linked with the degree to which a person feels connected to his or her 
future self (Herschfield, 2011). The concept of a life as a series of psychologically connected temporal 
selves is a notion developed by philosophers, such as Parfit (1971, 1982 and 1984), and explored by 
economists and behavioural scientists, such as Strotz (1955) and Frederick (2003 and 2006). The 
psychological connections at the core of this concept include our memories, personal characteristics 
and interests, all of which contribute to the make-up of our personal identity. Research suggests that 
strong psychological connections between the temporal selves facilitate saving – individuals who 
anticipate that their future personal identity will overlap considerably with their current identity tend 
to accumulate more financial assets than do those who sense little such overlap (Hershfield et al., 
2009). On the other hand, the more a person’s future self feels like a stranger, the more heavily that 
person might discount that stranger’s assets.  
Of course, the “brevity and uncertainty of human life” (Loewenstein, 1992) means that we can never 
be certain that our future selves will exist. Uncertainty is, however, “double-edged”: it can cause the 
future to be valued more than the present, or less (Olson and Bailey, 1981). Existential uncertainty, 
for example, can incentivize financial provision for an unexpectedly long life.  
The degree to which uncertainty influences personal discount rates depends, to a large extent, upon 
personal risk preference. Many of us are risk averse (Andersen et al., 2008). We prefer a certain reward 
to an uncertain reward of equal expected value (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). Some of us, in 
contrast, are risk seeking. We prefer the gamble. Just as personal time preferences can differ from 
those of the market, so too can personal risk preferences. 
Personal risk preferences can influence the valuation of leveraged investments. To the extent that 
they are willing and able to, individuals can borrow to fund investment. As with unleveraged 
investments, if investors discount the projected value of an investment funded with borrowings at its 
expected rate of return, valuation will be symmetric – a $1 investment will be valued today at a $1.  
Personal borrowing can enable investments that might not otherwise be affordable but leveraged 
investment is riskier than unleveraged investment. A risk averse individual might be expected to avoid 
highly leveraged investments (discounting their projected values at more than their expected rates of 
return), whereas risk seekers might personally value leveraged investments more highly than does the 
market (using a lower discount rate than the expected rates of return).  
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Investor profiles can be constructed based on personal time and risk preferences. For example, those 
who are: patient and risk averse might be classified as “conservative” investors; impatient but risk 
averse as the “short-sighted, prudent”; impatient and risk seeking as “hotheads”; and patient and risk 
tolerant as “enterprising” investors (Arrondel and Masson, 2013). We might want to define these 
profiles relative to that of the market. For example, we might define conservative investors as being 
more patient and more risk averse than is the market. 
Hyperbolic discounting provides a challenge to the stability of investor profiles over time. Discounting 
at a more rapid rate in the short term than the long term is typical of those of us who are impatient in 
the short term (hotheads), but patient over the long term (conservatives).  
A feature of hyperbolic discounting is “time inconsistency” or “preference reversal” – we value one 
apple today over two tomorrow but prefer two apples in 51 days over one apple in 50 days (Thaler, 
1981). We can see this if we study Chart 5, which combines exponential projection (assuming a 6% 
annual projection rate) with “quasi-hyperbolic” discounting [7] in another example of asymmetric 
valuation, and we think of value in terms of apples rather than dollars. (The quasi-hyperbolic model, 
also referred to as the “quasi-exponential” model (Sáez-Marti and Weibull, 2005), was designed to 
preserve exponential discounting for most periods, and all the useful mathematics that goes with it, 
yet capture the steep initial-period discount rate associated with hyperbolic discounting (Doyle, 
2013)).   
CHART 5: EXPONENTIAL PROJECTION WITH QUASI-HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING 
 
In Chart 5, the quasi-hyperbolic discount curve is steeper than the projection curve at year-1 but less 
steep at year-30. This means that today we discount more heavily than at 6% the projected 1.06 apples 























lower rate than that at which we discount year-29 apples – so the year-30 apples have a higher 
personal value now than have the year-29 apples. Of course, if we were to repeat our valuation 
exercise at year 29, we would then heavily discount the year-30 apples. This is a consequence of 
objective time passing. However, our thought investments, being mental time travel exercises, do not 
involve objective time passing, so we do not experience any preference reversals – and hence time 
inconsistency ‒ in our framework. 
3. MARKET VALUATION 
3.1 Symmetric market valuation 
When initial value is current market value, market valuation is symmetric – $1 invested today at 
current market value has a current market value of $1. But what if initial value is something other than 
current market value? What if it is net asset value?  (The NAV of a fund is the market value of the 
fund’s portfolio net of fund liabilities.) 
Think of an investment fund with a current NAV of $1 per share. Imagine this value being projected 
forward and discounted back by the market to current market value. Here, when symmetrically 
valued, a share in the fund has a current market value of $1, i.e., the share price trades at NAV. This is 
so, regardless of the duration and the nature of the underlying investments.   
When projecting NAV and discounting projected NAV back to current market value, market valuation 
is not always symmetric – market value does not always equal NAV. We consider how and why they 
might differ in the next sub-section. We do so by portraying as mental time travel four of the most 
important explanations of the “closed-end fund puzzle”. 
Investment funds can be open-end (with a variable issued share capital or number of units) or closed-
end (with a fixed number of shares). Open-end fund shares always trade at NAV (they are 
symmetrically valued) because they can be issued or redeemed at NAV at any time. But this is not the 
case for closed-end funds.  A closed-end fund occasionally trades at NAV, sometimes at a premium, 
but most typically at a discount, to NAV. Differences between the two measures (share price and NAV) 
are a well-known puzzle in financial markets. The closed-end fund puzzle is an exhaustive subject and 
we only scratch the surface here. (For comprehensive descriptions of the puzzle and its many 
explanations, see, for example, Lee et al., 1991, Deaves and Krinsky, 1994, Chay and Trzcinka, 1999, 
Ferguson and Leistikow, 2001, Dimson and Minio-Paluello, 2002, Berk and Stanton, 2007, and Bleaney 
and Smith, 2008.) 
3.2 Asymmetric market valuation 
3.2.1 Expectations - management expenses hypothesis 
We noted, in the preceding section, that personal valuation will be asymmetric if personal and market 
expectations differ but personal discount rates match those of the market. Similarly, closed-end funds 
will trade at other than market price if expectations for the fund and for its underlying portfolio of 
assets differ, but the rates at which fund and portfolio projected values are discounted are the same.  
One reason why the expected return on a fund might differ from that of its underlying portfolio is that 
the fund incurs management expenses. The discount to NAV at which a closed-end fund’s shares 
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trade, it is hypothesized, reflects the discounted value of future management fees (Gemmill and 
Thomas, 2002, and Ross, 2004). 
Assume that $1 invested directly in the portfolio is projected to grow exponentially at 6% a year to 
$5.74 at the end of 30 years. Now assume that the fund accrues management expenses (equal to 1% 
p.a. of the value of the portfolio at the beginning of each year) whose value totals $0.79 per $1 
invested by the end of year-30, thereby reducing the net return on the invested $1 from $5.74 to 
$4.95. Fund investors expect a compound annual return of 6% on their investment (the expected 
return on the portfolio) so they discount the projected $4.95 at this rate – the $1 investment has a 
current market value of $0.86, a 14% discount to current NAV; and the present value of the accrued 
expenses is $0.14. In this thought investment, the fund’s share price differs from its NAV because 
market expectations of the return on its shares differ from those of the return on its underlying 
portfolio, but the fund discount rate is the expected portfolio return. 
We can see that the discount to NAV at which a fund’s share price trades will be a function of both 
the level of management fees and the life expectancy of the fund (the future period over which cash 
flows are discounted) [8]. 
3.2.2 Expectations – management performance hypothesis  
Management expenses can explain why a fund’s share price might trade at a discount to NAV, but not 
why it might trade at a premium nor why discounts should fluctuate. To explain these, we need to 
consider, additionally, management performance expectations which can mitigate or magnify the 
effect of management expenses. A share price premium to NAV, it is hypothesized, reflects investors’ 
perception of management’s ability to generate returns in excess of the expected return on the 
underlying portfolio, net of costs, whereas a discount greater than that of the present value of 
management expenses reflects anticipated managerial underperformance (Deaves and Krinsky, 1994, 
Berk and Stanton, 2004). 
3.2.3 Expectations – investment services hypothesis 
Closed-end funds incur management expenses in return for management services and, in addition to 
management expertise, investors receive, or expect to receive, other benefits which Cherkes, 2012, 
labels “investment services”. These include: access to leverage; liquidity; and market-segmented 
investment. As with the management performance hypothesis, the investment services hypothesis 
envisages a trade-off between the value of these investment services and the cost of management 
services.  
Leverage 
Closed-end funds have the ability to borrow and they may do so when the expected investment 
returns from borrowing exceed borrowing costs. Borrowing increases the projected return on an 
equity investment in a fund, but it also increases its risk. The expected return on the investment should 
reflect this risk. As with investment in an unleveraged fund, if fund investors discount the projected 
future value of their investment at its expected rate of return, valuation will be symmetric – a $1 
investment will be valued at a $1. As with personal borrowings, however, individuals who are more 
risk averse than the market might be expected to heavily discount the projected value of a highly 
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leveraged investment fund, whereas individuals who are more risk seeking than is the market might 
be expected to value such funds more highly than does the market. 
Research by Elton et al., 2013, finds that closed-end US bond funds can borrow at a much lower cost 
than can individual investors. Investment in such funds thus offers these investors borrowing facilities 
at rates not personally available. These investors, it is hypothesized, reduce the rate at which they 
discount such a fund’s projected value so as to reflect the perceived value of cheap borrowings. Chart 
6 illustrates the effect of leverage on the valuation of an investment fund. It assumes that a fund, with 
no previous liabilities and a current NAV of $1 per share, borrows $1 for each $1 of equity, at a 
compound annual interest rate of 2%. So, the fund has $2 of portfolio assets per share and $1 of 
borrowings per share. Chart 6 assumes that the portfolio assets grow at a compound annual rate of 
6% (and that management performance expectations exactly match the cost of management 
expenses, so the net return on the fund equals the gross return of 6% on the underlying portfolio of 
assets). They have a projected value at the end of year 30 of $11.49. The $1 per share borrowing has 
a projected value of $1.81 at that time, implying that NAV per share has a projected value of $9.68 
(i.e., $11.49 ‒ $1.81, compared to the projected value of $5.74 for the unleveraged $1 investment). If 
that value is discounted at the expected annual return on portfolio assets of 6%, reflecting the 
perceived benefit of fund borrowings, the fund will have a current share price of $1.68, a premium to 
NAV. (Note that the growth rate of the net investment of $1 is not constant. It falls over time as the 
level of gearing falls: assets grow over time at a higher rate (6% p.a.) than liabilities (2% p.a.)) 





































Closed-end funds can also offer investors what Cherkes, 2012, labels “liquidity transformation”. They 
can transform illiquid assets (their portfolios) that are costly for small investors to acquire into liquid 
securities (their shares or units) that are cheaper to acquire and easier to liquidate. As with 
management performance expectations, the hypothesis here is that the premium, or discount to, NAV 
at which a fund’s share price trades reflects the extent to which the perceived value of liquidity 
exceeds, or is exceeded by, the cost of the provision of management services. In the absence of 
management fees, a fund will trade at a premium to NAV because investors require a liquidity 
premium on the expected return of its underlying portfolio but not on that of the fund itself. 
Market segmentation 
A further service offered to closed-end fund investors is access to foreign investments through so-
called “country funds”. Again, it is hypothesized, if investors value such a service, because it offers 
investment opportunities not otherwise available to them, they may be prepared to reduce the rate 
at which they discount a country fund’s projected value. Grullon and Wang, 2001, for example, report 
that U.S. closed-end funds investing in foreign securities tend to trade at lower discounts than those 
investing in domestic securities because it is easier for investors to diversify on their own in their home 
market.  
3.2.4 Perceptions ‒ investor sentiment hypothesis 
We noted, in Section 3.2.1, that personal valuation will be asymmetric if personal expectations match 
those of the market but personal and market discount rates differ. Similarly, closed-end funds will 
trade at other than market price if expectations for the fund match those of its underlying portfolio, 
but the rates at which fund and portfolio projected values are discounted differ.  
An alternative explanation for the puzzle focuses on the fund discount rate which, it is hypothesized, 
exceeds the expected portfolio return.   We noted, in Section 2.2.2, that investors can be categorized 
as rational or as irrational (“noise traders”) and that noise traders are prone to “investor sentiment” 
– expectations about future cash flows and risk not justified by the information available to investors. 
The hypothesis here is that if there is a higher concentration of irrational investors in the ownership 
of a fund than in the ownership of the fund’s underlying portfolio of assets, and if there are limits to 
arbitrage, investing in the fund will be riskier than holding the same portfolio directly. As a 
consequence, the rate of return required on the fund (the discount rate used) by investors will be 
higher than that of its portfolio (the projected growth rate). Assuming the expected fund return 
matches that of its portfolio, the market value of the fund will be lower than its NAV. Movements in 
the level of the share price discount to NAV over time, it is hypothesized, reflect fluctuating noise 
trader expectations (Lee et al., 1991). 
Assume that $1 invested in the fund at NAV is projected to grow at a compound annual rate of 6%, 
net of expenses, to $5.74 at the end of year 30. Assume also that, because of noise trader risk, rational 
investors in the fund require an annual rate of return of 7%. Discounting the projected $5.74 at a 7% 
discount rate gives a current market value of $0.75, a 25% discount to current NAV. (Note that the 
investor sentiment hypothesis does not imply that asymmetric valuation is necessarily irrational.) 
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Grullon and Wang, 2001, highlight a further difference in risk perception between fund and underlying 
portfolio investors. They suggest that closed-end fund discounts can arise when the quality of private 
information (such as security analysts’ reports) possessed by (mainly institutional) investors in the 
underlying portfolio is better than that possessed by (mainly individual) fund investors. Because the 
fund is perceived as being riskier than its portfolio, its projected NAV is discounted at a rate higher 
than the expected return on its portfolio – so the fund trades at a discount to NAV. 
 
4. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN PERSONAL AND MARKET VALUATIONS  
 
In Section 2, we explained how personal valuations can differ from market valuations when personal 
expectations, perceptions and preferences differ from those of the market. The investor sentiment 
hypothesis assumes that the investors in a fund are distinct from those who invest directly in its 
portfolio of assets (Lee et al., 1991). We might think of the market valuation of a fund as being a 
personal valuation – the weighted average of all fund investors. If we do so, we might not be too 
puzzled that the market value of the fund should differ from its NAV. Indeed, we might attribute it to 
differences between the expectations, perceptions and preferences of those who invest in the fund 
and those who invest directly in its portfolio of assets.  
We might expect, then, time and risk preferences to play a role in the valuation of closed-end funds. 
As in Section 2.2.2, think of the two temporal value curves in Chart 1 as recording the market’s 
expectations of the NAVs of two investment funds. These expectations reflect the market’s time and 
risk preferences. As before, assume that the market perceives that Hyperbolic is more risky than 
Exponential in the short term but less risky in the long term.  Assume, too, that personal expectations 
of the future values of the two funds match those of the market as do personal risk perceptions. We 
might expect, for example, that:  
 
• conservative investors (being both more patient and more risk averse than the market) will 
value Hyperbolic more highly than Exponential;  
• short-sighted, prudent investors (being less patient and more risk averse than the market) will 
discount both investments more heavily than does the market, thereby personally valuing 
them at less than market value; 
• hotheads (who are impatient gamblers) will favour speculation over investment in either fund; 
and  
• enterprising investors (who are patient and risk seeking) might personally value a $1 invested 
in Exponential more highly than a $1 invested in Hyperbolic.  
The actual market value of the fund will reflect the relative weight of these different investor types in 
the fund.  
We might expect similar valuation differences if individual funds have distinct shareholder bases. If, 
for example, individual investors suffer more existential unease, have more loosely connected 
temporal selves and are more impatient and more risk averse than institutional investors, those 
investment funds which are owned mainly by retail investors might be expected to trade at wider 
share price discounts to NAV than do those with predominantly institutional shareholder bases.  
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In section 3, we highlighted some of the explanations offered for the closed-end fund puzzle. If we 
think of the market valuation of a fund as being a personal valuation, we might expect that these 
explanations would provide insights into how differing expectations, perceptions and preferences can 
lead to differing personal valuations. We might expect investor sentiment, for example, to be reflected 
not just in irrational expectations, but also in investor misperceptions and in extreme time and risk 
preferences. We noted that, if small investors are otherwise excluded from the investment services’ 
opportunities offered by a closed-end fund, they might value such services more highly than do large 
investors in the fund’s underlying portfolio. Accordingly, we might add leverage preference, liquidity 
preference and market segmentation preference to risk preference and time preference as rational 
explanations for asymmetric personal discounting.  
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have portrayed the valuation of financial investments as mental time travel. We 
began with exponential and hyperbolic valuation. We explained how the temporal value curves in 
Chart 1 can be read both as projecting forward an initial value and as discounting that projected value 
back to the present. So read, we have two pairs of curves (one pair exponential, one pair hyperbolic) 
each, in turn, comprising two curves identical save for the direction of travel. Each pair of curves traces 
a mental time travel journey, or thought investment, in which an initial value is instantaneously 
mentally simulated forward 30 years and then back to a current value.  It is important to note that no 
objective time passes in these thought investments.   
We called the exact matching of projection and discount curves in Chart 1 “symmetric valuation”. We 
showed how, when valued symmetrically: personal value will be the same as market value; and an 
investment fund’s share price will trade at NAV. This is so whether valuation is exponential, hyperbolic 
or any other method and regardless of the duration of the investment. 
These curves record expectations and reflect perceptions and preferences. Personal expectations, 
perceptions and preferences will either match or differ from those of the market – where they match, 
personal valuations will match market valuations; where they do not match, personal valuations may 
differ from market valuations. Likewise, the expectations, perceptions and preferences of an 
investment fund’s investors will either match or differ from those of its underlying portfolio of assets 
– where they match, the fund’s shares will trade at NAV; where they do not match, share price and 
NAV may differ. 
We called the non-exact matching of projection and discount curves “asymmetric valuation”. 
Asymmetry can arise whether valuation is exponential, hyperbolic or any other method. We noted 
that there might be some combinations of method (such as exponential projection and hyperbolic 
discounting) where asymmetric valuation does not preclude the possibility that personal value will be 
the same as market value and an investment fund’s share price will trade at NAV. We termed this 
“asymmetric matching” and we explained how the duration of the investment might be a determining 
factor of asymmetric matching. 
We then explored possible reasons for asymmetric personal valuation which, we suggested, might not 
be unexpected if projecting and discounting are psychologically distinct. We looked at how personal 
expectations, perceptions and preferences might differ from those of the market. We suggested that 
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it might be possible to construct investor profiles defined by personal preferences relative to those of 
the market.  
To illustrate our theorizing, we portrayed as mental time travel four of the main hypotheses offered 
for the closed-end fund puzzle: management expenses; management performance; investment 
services; and investor sentiment. We showed how asymmetrically valuing a fund results in a fund 
share price discount, or premium, to NAV.  
The management expenses and performance hypotheses propose differing fund and portfolio 
expectations with a common discount rate (the expected return on the portfolio). Here, for example, 
a fund might be valued at a discount to its NAV because it is expected to return less than its portfolio. 
The investor sentiment hypothesis, on the other hand, allows for common expected returns but with 
different discount rates – the fund discount rate being the expected portfolio return adjusted for noise 
trader risk. Here, the fund discount rate is greater than its expected return. The investment services 
hypothesis allows for both fund expectations and discount rates to differ from those of the portfolio.  
The investor sentiment hypothesis rests, in part, on the dual assumptions of a fund investor base 
distinct from that of its portfolio and of a higher concentration of irrational investors in the ownership 
of a fund than in the ownership of its portfolio.  It may be that the former assumption, alone, is 
sufficient to explain the closed-end fund puzzle. If the investors in a fund differ from those who invest 
directly in its portfolio, we might expect that the expectations, perceptions and preferences of fund 
investors will differ from those of direct investors. So, we should not be too surprised that the market 
value of a fund often differs from its NAV. 
Indeed, it may be that even the assumption of a distinct fund investor base is unnecessary to explain 
the puzzle. It may be sufficient that investors perceive the fund as being an investment distinct from 
that of its underlying portfolio of assets. If investors’ expectations and perceptions of the fund differ 
from those of its portfolio (as, for example, Grullon and Wang, 2001, discussed above, suggest), we 
might expect that the valuations of the fund and its underlying portfolio of assets will differ.   
 
The key message, then, of this paper is that financial investment valuation is personal, with market 
value being no more than a weighted average of personal valuations. Value, therefore, lies in the mind 
of the beholders that make up the market place. This suggests that market value can differ from 
“fundamental” (or “intrinsic”) value and can do so for extended periods. 
 
If valuation is personal, the key to successful financial valuation lies in understanding how the personal 
expectations and preferences (of an individual investor or an individual fund’s shareholder base) differ 
from those of the wider market. For example, if the market projects exponentially (at a constant rate 
r over time), those who discount hyperbolically (at a higher rate than r in the short term and at a lower 
rate in the long term), might find illiquid, long term investments (so called “golden eggs” such as 
pensions, real estate, savings bonds and certificates of deposit) more attractive than publicly traded 
investment funds (see Laibson, 1997). On the other hand, if markets offer higher rates of return for 
short investment periods than for long ones, those who discount the future at a constant rate will 
personally value short term securities over long term securities of a similar nature (Lowenstein and 
Prelec, 1992). (It also has powerful implications for savings behaviour and inducing changes to savings 
behaviour. For example, people who project hyperbolically but discount exponentially do not value 
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long-term savings and need to be induced (or “nudged”) into joining long-term savings plans along 
lines proposed by Thaler and Benartzi (2004) with their “save more tomorrow” programmes.) 
 
We mentioned in the Introduction that this paper was motivated by a discussion about the relative 
values of a $1 invested in equities and another $1 invested in bonds. As we have seen, when valued 
symmetrically, $1 invested in equities has the same value as $1 invested in bonds. But this is rarely so 
when valuation is asymmetric. As we have explained, differing personal expectations, perceptions and 
preferences mean that some of us value equities over bonds, some of us prefer bonds, while yet others 
are happier with a trip down to the betting shop. 
 
As a final point, we would argue that mental time travel is the starting point of all decision-making 
involving the future.  It certainly applies to humans. It might even apply to other animals.  Is the lion 
observing a wildebeest projecting forward ‒ to estimate the benefits ‒ and discounting backwards ‒ 




1. We use the formula (1+r)T  to define the exponential projection function for a T-year 
investment horizon. Chart 1 assumes that r = 6%. 
2. We use the formula (1+αT)γ/α, where γ and α are constants, to define the T-year hyperbolic 
projection function (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992, Laibson, 1998). Chart 1 assumes γ = 1 and 
α = 4. 
3. We use the formula (1+r)-T to define the T-year exponential discount function. Chart 1 assumes 
that r =6%. 
4. We use the formula (1+αT)-γ/α  to define the T-year hyperbolic discount function (Loewenstein 
and Prelec, 1992, Laibson, 1998). Chart 1 assumes that γ = 1 and α = 4. 
5. So long as the discount function associated with a method exists and can be defined as the 
inverse function of the projection function.  
6. As in Chart 1, we use the formula (1+αT)γ/α, where γ and α are constants, to define the T-year 
hyperbolic projection function. As in Chart 1, γ = 1 and α = 4. As in Chart 1, we use the formula 
(1+r)-T  to define the T-year exponential discount function. As in Chart 1, r =6%. 
7. The quasi-hyperbolic discount function is {1, δ, δ2, δ3, …δT} for t = 0, 1, 2, 3,…,T, respectively, 
with δ < 1. Here β = 0.7 and δ = 0.95 approximately, which approximately equates to a year 1 
r of 50% and r thereafter of 3% per objective year (equivalent to 6% per subjective year). 
Derived from Angeletos et al., 2001. 
8. Gemmill and Thomas, 2017, show that, for a non-income paying fund, the discount to NAV 
formula is                  
�(1+𝑟𝑟−𝛾𝛾)(1+𝑟𝑟−𝜃𝜃)�
𝑇𝑇
− 1                                      
where γ is the expenses ratio, Ɵ is the benefit rate received from incurring management 
services and T is the expected life of the fund. Note that this formula assumes exponential 
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